Authored by Aditya Maheshwari, a 2nd-year law student at National Law School of India University, Bangalore
Introduction
Federalism as a contemporarily contentious constitutional principle seeks to ensure a fair distribution of powers between the Union and the States. Indian federalism, in particular, is dynamic and unique- different from the classical, State-centric model of federalism. Even if, it is structured to establish the Union’s supremacy in the interest of national unity, it aims to reconcile the same with regional autonomy and diversity. Such a model envisions cooperative federalism by vouching for close collaborations between the Union and the States. Owing to the same, federalism debates in the Indian context, especially after the recent Article 370 judgement (which revisited Article 3), remain relevant, multi-faceted and convoluted as they warrant a balance between autonomy of States and national unity. Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, which deals with State reorganisation, adds more complications to such debates by favouring an extremely robust Union over enhanced State autonomy. This blog undertakes a doctrinal analysis of Article 3 by critiquing its nature and implications. It recommends relevant amendments to Article 3, focusing mainly on a meticulous exploration of reasons for such a proposition. The blog anchors its arguments in scholarly analyses of Article 3 and larger conceptions of Indian federalism and democracy. It navigates legitimate caveats like national unity, the actual intent of our Constitution framers and a determination of the dynamic Indian federalism’s true nature. Ultimately, it argues for Article 3 to be made more federal in nature- plugging the gap between its current unitary traits and the overall constitutional conception of Indian federalism highlighted above.
Making a Case for Amending Article 3 of the Constitution
Article 3 of the Indian Constitution demands to be amended in certain ways, which I believe will bring it closer to the ideal exercise of federalism as envisaged by the Constitution framers. Firstly: the provision leaves scope for politically motivated misuse by the Central Government. The non-binding nature of State views on the Parliament along with limited consultations with them on matters of their own reorganisation give the Centre an untenable discretion for unilateral action in such matters. The Centre can merely make a formal State reference without actually incorporating any of their objections or suggestions. Such a mandate is only applicable in form rather than in its substance. The Centre can thus weaponise this power to violate the fundamental rights of the people of a politically antagonistic State- a possibility which was decried in Director of Industries & Commerce, AP. v. V. Venkata Reddy. After all, conflicts between the Union and the States are quite political in nature. The powers in Article 3 do seem to allow the Union to interfere in the functioning of States with opposing party affiliations. Thus, the provision should be amended to strengthen State views as partially if not fully binding or to treat them as persuasive guidelines that Parliament debates must address while amending the Bill. This proposition is, therefore, in line with cooperative federalism and is a protest against the misuse of constitutional powers by the Union for political advantages.
Secondly, Article 3 does not seem to align with our Constitution’s State-considerate (not necessarily State-centric) nature that its framers envisioned in and around Constituent Assembly deliberations. Ambedkar observed that States are not administrative units/agencies of the Union. Even Nehru’s perception of Centre-State relations was democratic and cooperative, not confrontational. However, Article 3 seems to be setting up an emphatically unitary form of government. Here it becomes pertinent to acknowledge that the framers’ intent on federalism was deeply divided and convoluted. Ambedkar himself did not favour federalism in the beginning, for which he was attacked by Constituent Assembly members like Kamath. Overall, however, Indian ‘federalism’ is not classic but circumstantial and the Constitution is federal in a contextual and dual polity sense.
To align Article 3 with our unique federal constitutionalism and to protect the States against dismemberment, Article 3 should be amended to mandate State reorganisation after multi-level and wide consultations with diverse stakeholders across the State. Consultations (if not outright consent) confined to the State Legislature would not be adequate without the involvement of the State’s public including civil society groups, bodies representing marginalised communities not adequately represented in the State Legislature, etc. After all, the commission which recommended that Telangana be a separate state had concluded so after considering a complete cross-section of public opinion. The demand for Telangana that stemmed from its populace’s socioeconomic grievances- represented both social classes and political aspirations. Article 3 could also be amended to provide for State consultations on every amendment of a reorganisation Bill and stipulate explicit State consent for reorganisation (before the Bill is passed) though the latter should only be resorted to if the previous amendments (for example- if State recommendations are not fully binding) are somehow circumvented by the Centre.
Navigating the Pressing Caveats
The national unity caveat which every amendment would have to navigate through, should be addressed as the same is also integral to our model of federalism. Even though this blog supports State autonomy, it does not extend to supporting their right to secede from the Union in the larger constitutional goal of national unity and integrity. Any consultations or consent amendments should contain provisos that grant the Centre the right to constrain or override those mandates during any national security crises that jeopardise India’s territorial integrity. Such a right would be in line with the contextual uniqueness of Indian federalism - adopted to suit peculiar national/state needs. Such a right (which must be protected against misuse) would be in the nation’s best interests as it would espouse State autonomy in normal times, keeping its populace content and cooperative and furthering regional development. However, in light of urgent actions required to safeguard national unity, it would back unitary governance in times of emergency as a reasonable restriction on regional autonomy. One of our Constitution framers’ scepticisms about increased State autonomy arose due to national unity concerns. Nehru feared that that could lurch India towards ‘balkanisation’ (ultimate disintegration). This blog’s approach fits well within the framers’ intent of safeguarding national unity. Scholars have recognised that people-centric reorganisation has consolidated Indian unity by acting as a constructive channel for provincial pride and multiculturalism. An over-centralised federal system is incapable of dealing effectively with socioeconomic challenges and strengthening national unity. Since federalism is a reconciliation between nationalism and regionalism, regionalism (not to the extreme of separatism) must be accepted as a part of democratic processes to construct the nation. Article 3’s current sweeping powers can alter or even obliterate a State’s identity. Such a power, if deployed by the Centre without due consideration of the State’s subjective and public needs, can lead to secessionist resentments and even armed insurgencies in that State- compromising national unity outright. Furthermore, in current times, the federal system with its strong Union has contributed to the preservation and consolidation of India’s integrity despite many separatist movements that have taken place/are taking place in India. This highlights a shift in our country’s political context- from the Constitution framers’ substantial national unity qualms (the premise of Article 3) during Partition, intense communal strife and a violent subjugation of the Nizam’s insurgency right in the heart of India to this blog’s claims premised and therefore, justified- in a largely stable nation. Thus, it is opined that Article 3 should be amended to enhance State autonomy amid presently mitigated fears of national unity falling apart.
Another caveat is the perpetuation of an interminable process of referring every Bill amendment along with the time and logistics stretch during the process of multi-level consultations on those amendments. Notwithstanding the importance of such a concern, it should remain subservient to the larger interest of national unity. The interrelation between the reorganisation of States and their people’s socioeconomic considerations was portrayed earlier in the blog. In this regard, the concerned people’s voices cannot be sidelined at any step of the reorganisation process- however big or small it may be. If not followed, it could lead to resentment among that State’s populace and enable insurgents or other public miscreants to project power into the movement and put public unity at risk. Historically speaking, Prime Minister Nehru had to accept the formation of the new state of Andhra Pradesh or face the prospect of a violent agitation among the Telugu people. In fact, Article 3 itself caused the Centre to capitulate on the issue of creating new linguistic provinces under public pressure. It is thus evident that the Centre cannot remain oblivious to public needs on questions of State reorganisation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this blog has been critical of Article 3 of the Constitution due to the provision’s inconsistencies with the ideal of collaborative Indian federalism. Owing to the same, it has argued for more State autonomy, discretion and leverage in matters that involve their own reorganisation. Herein, it is pertinent to reiterate that the blog has not criticised the Constitution framers’ intent behind drafting Article 3 as the provision, in their wisdom, was necessary to avert disunity at that time of national turmoil. However, various amendments to Article 3 have been advocated for in the present-day context of a largely united and sovereign nation-state. Through the proposed amendments to Article 3, reconstructing relations between the Union and the States in line with Indian federalism has been espoused as a much-needed way forward. After all, the amendments envision the Union and the States as partners and not competitors in solving national problems and in meeting the citizen’s needs- an approach that would make today’s national unity more robust.