Authored by Rishabh Tomar, Assistant Professor of Law, UILS, Chandigarh University
Abstract
This article explores the role of constitutional design in stabilizing post-conflict societies through a comparative analysis of four nations: They include South Africa, Rwanda, Iraq as well as Colombia. All these countries came out of conflict or authoritarianism and therefore their reconstruction was anchored on constitutionalism. The paper analyzes the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of these constitutions in achieving peace, effective administrations and nationality. Dependable human rights protection was seen as one of the aspects that made up South Africa’s constitution to be one of the most inclusive constitutions in the world that spearheaded change from apartheid to democracy. Rwanda’s post-genocide constitution strengthens the call for unity and reconciliation but is widely criticized for authoritarianism. The post-2003 Iraqi constitution is filled with tensions based on sectarianism, and suffices to say that the Colombian constitution of 1991 has played a crucial role in the reconstruction and, especially, the conflict-resolution in internal warfare with rebels. Interestingly, the article also outlines constitutional key features of constitutionalism, such as the incorporation of everybody and minority, as well as entrenchment of institutions. From this comparative analysis the following broad lessons can be deduced about the role and risks of constitutions in consolidating stability in postconflict societies. It is for this reason that this analysis emphasizes the need for legal pliable enough to address political, social, and historical incidences in post-conflict countries.